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Abstract
In common agency games, one cannot characterize all equilibria by considering
only direct mechanisms. In an attempt to overcome this difficulty, Peters [Econo-
metrica, 2001] and Martimort and Stole [Econometrica, 2002] identified a class of
indirect mechanisms (namely, menus) which are able to characterize every equi-
librium. Unfortunately, menus are difficult to handle, and several methodologies
have been proposed in the literature. Here, it is shown that, even if authors consider
menus rather than simpler mechanisms, many equilibria described in the literature
could have been characterized by direct incentive compatible mechanisms. Use of
more sophisticated mechanisms was not necessary in these cases.
Keywords Common Agency, Revelation Principle, Delegation Principle, Direct
Mechanisms, Menus, Latent Contracts.
JEL Classification D82.
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1 Introduction
The restriction to direct incentive compatible mechanisms is a cornerstone of contract
theory. It provides a simple and elegant method for characterizing arbitrary equilib-
ria in any principal-agent model, even with very complex communication between the
players. Because of its tractability, the principal-agent model has been very successful,
and it has revitalized many economic fields: Regulation, redistribution, insurance and
others.1 Multiagent games have provided the basis for auction theory and the theory of
the provision of public goods.
Unfortunately, the restriction to direct incentive compatible mechanisms causes some
loss of generality in multi-principal games. Intuitively, simple contracts fail to be gen-
eral because the structure of the game involves endogenous information. For a principal,
relevant information includes not only the type of the agent (for example his/her will-
ingness to pay in a case of a duopoly) but also the message that the agent sends to
other principals; the message sent sets a particular agreement between a principal and
the agent, which could modify the agent’s willingness to pay for the products of other
principals.
A strategy for overcoming this limitation is to give up the concept of “direct mech-
anism” or any of its generalizations, and consider the Taxation Principle. This principle
was introduced by Hammond [1979], Guesnerie [1981] and Rochet [1986], and states
that there is no loss of generality in considering menus, or nonlinear prices. Peters
[2001] and Martimort and Stole [2002] show that an equivalent of the Taxation Princi-
ple (they call it Delegation Principle) makes it possible to characterize any equilibrium
of any common agency game. The problem with this approach is that the concept of
menu is large for common agency games, and, even if it simplifies the game, equilibria
remain hard to characterize. To reach tractable problems, other ad hoc assumptions are
added to restrict the menu set.
The present paper does not question the validity of the differing further assumptions
made in the literature. We welcome assumptions (differentiability or continuity) if they
allow ready characterization of equilibria in this class of games. The cost of these
assumptions is probably a loss of generality.2 Nevertheless, the author does not believe
that restrictions invalidate the results obtained with menus. The methodologies used to
find a fixed-point in common agency games in which menus are allowed are criticized.
The present paper shows that, in almost all models of the common agency literature,
equilibria characterized by menus could have been characterized by direct mechanisms.
1See Laffont and Martimort [2002] for a complete survey.
2In common agency games, some equilibria may be sustained by discontinuous menus; see Laffont
and Tirole [1993] ch 17.
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The basic intuition is that menus can characterize a large set of equilibria because a
principal, by using a menu, can create sophisticated rewards.
Given menus, it might seem that analysis of common agency games is simply a
matter of computation. Unfortunately, though the use of menus may be helpful in this
class of game, it does not permit ready characterization of equilibria. Below, it is argued
that common methodologies used in the literature characterize only a restricted set of
pure strategy equilibria. Let us now consider the “latent contract” concept, which gives
insight into the main result.
The next section presents a basic common agency model. Section 3 defines direct
mechanisms and menus. Section 4 introduces the concept of latent contracts. In section
5 some examples are presented from the literature. Section 6 sets out conclusions.
2 The Model
Consider a scenario in which there are a number of principals (indexed by i ∈ N =
{1, ...,n}) contracting with one agent (denoted by index, 0). The agent’s type is drawn
from a compact set Θ having a probability distribution F (.) that is common knowledge.
The principal i also makes an action: He has to decide which allocation yi ∈ Yi to im-
plement. The implemented allocation is observable and contractible. This means that
a principal can write a contract which specifies his chosen allocation. Let us make the
stronger assumption that a principal is not able to contract on a probability distribution
over Yi.
The payoff to principal i ∈ {1, . . . ,N} is represented by the vNM utility function
Vi : ∏
k∈N
Yk×Θ → R+,
and for the agent the payoff is represented by the function
U : ∏
k∈N
Yk×Θ → R+.
Preferences could be more general; the restriction to von Neumann-Morgenstern utility
functions is not critical for any of the following results, but merely makes the model
simpler. Moreover, applications in the literature invariably consider this class of prefer-
ences.
The principals compete through mechanisms. Each principal’s mechanism is a map
from Mi to Yi, where Mi is the message space. Each set Mi (for any principal i) is
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compact, and each map σi is measurable. For clarity, we require any mechanisms σi
to be such that the image set σi (Mi) is a compact set. We denote by Σi the set of all
available map σi to principal i when his message space is Mi. We denote by M =×i∈NMi
the collection of the chosen message space, and Σ is the collection of Σi.
Denote by σi (mi) the decision yi in Yi that the agent gets by sending the message
mi to the principal i. We explicitly assume that the rule σi (.) is enforceable. Once a
principal has announced a mechanism, he commits himself to respect his own rule; if
he receives a message mi, he cannot choose a decision different from σi (mi). Finally,
since the sets σi (Mi) are compact, it follows that
argmax
(mi,m−i)∈Mi×M−i
U (σi (mi) ,σ−i (m−i) ,θ) 6= /0. (1)
The agent’s pure strategy is to choose a message mi ∈ Mi for each principal. Hence,
a pure strategy for the agent is a map σ0 : Θ×Σ → M. We denote by Σ0 the collection
of all these possible pure strategies.
3 Direct Mechanisms and Menus
In the game ΓM we have made only made standard assumptions concerning the sets Mi.
The message spaces may be quite complex. We can simplify the game by considering
direct mechanisms. For each principal the message space Mi is given, and coincides
with the agent’s type space Θ. We thereby restrict the strategy spaces of the principals.
The strategy of principal i is the map σ˜i : Θ×E →Yi; we let ˜Σi be the strategy space
for principal i, and ˜Σ be the collection of all such strategy profiles.
The strategy of the agent is then a map σ˜0 : Θ× ˜Σ→ΘN , and ˜Σ0 denotes the collec-
tion of all such maps.
Given Θ, the common agency game induced by direct mechanism is the array:
ΓΘ =
{
Θ,
(
˜Σi
)
i∈N ,
˜Σ0,U(.,θ),(Vi(.,θ))i∈N ,F (.)
}
.
Direct mechanisms have an obvious appeal – the message spaces are simple and given.
But, to be useful, we need more than a simplification of the message space. To apply
the traditional principal-agent methodology, we need also incentive compatibility.
Definition 1 A collection of strategies ((σ˜∗i )i∈N , σ˜∗0) is an incentive compatible equi-
librium of the game ΓΘ if it satisfies the following two conditions:
∀θ ∈ Θ, if σ˜∗0
(
(σ˜∗i )i∈N ,θ
)
= (θ, . . . ,θ, e˜∗ (θ)) , then ∀ i ∈ N, ti = θ. (2)
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∀ i ∈ N, σˆi ∈ ˜Σi is such that σ˜∗0
(
σˆi, σ˜∗−i,θ
)
= (t1 (θ) , . . . , tN (θ) , e˜(θ)) , with ti (θ) = θ
then σˆi is not a profitable deviation:
R
Θ vi (σˆi (θ) , σ˜−i (t−i (θ)) ,θ, e˜(θ))d F (θ)≤
R
Θ vi (σ˜i (θ) , σ˜−i (θ) ,θ, e˜∗)d F (θ) . (3)
When is it possible to restrict attention to direct incentive compatible mechanisms?
In other words, is it always the case that, for any equilibrium σ∗ of the game ΓM , there
exists a incentive compatible equilibrium σ˜∗ of the game ΓΘ such that the two equilibria
are outcome equivalent? For common agency games this is not so (see, for instance,
Peck [1997], Martimort and Stole [2002]). In games with multiple principals, equilibria
may exist whose outcomes cannot be supported in equilibrium in the corresponding
direct mechanism game.
Peters [2001] and Martimort and Stole [2002] show that even if one cannot restrict
attention to direct incentive compatible mechanisms, a modified version of the Taxation
Principle applies. This principle states that, without loss of generality:
• One can restrict the set of message space and consider the sets of all compact
subsets of Yi rather than Mi.
• The map σi is the identity over the chosen subset of Yi.
Given Y =×i∈NYi, the common agency game induced by menu is the array
ΓY =
{
Θ,(Zi)i∈N ,Σ0,U (.,θ) ,(Vi (.,θ))i∈N ,F (.)
}
,
where Σ0 is defined as Σ0. Here Zi denotes the set of all compact subsets of Yi, and Ti is
a generic element of Zi. We will use the obvious notation T =×i∈NTi.
Theorem 1 The three following statements can be established:
• For every equilibrium
(
σ∗,σ∗0
)
of the game ΓM there exists a an outcome equiv-
alent equilibrium
(
T ∗, σ¯∗0
)
of the game ΓY .
• For any equilibrium
(
T ∗, σ¯∗0
)
of the game ΓY there exists an outcome equivalent
equilibrium
(
pi∗,σ∗0
)
of the game ΓM .
• For any incentive compatible pure strategy equilibrium
(
σ˜∗, σ˜∗0
)
of the game ΓΘN ,
there exists a pure strategy equilibrium of the game ΓM such that the two equilib-
ria are outcome equivalent.
The two first statements have been shown by Peters [2001] and Martimort and Stole
[2002]. The third is a result from Peters [2003]. The last statement of the theorem is
very general, and it does not rely on any assumption about the action space available to
the agent. It applies to all common agency models in the literature to date.
6
4 Latent contracts
This section demonstrates how “latent contracts” can help to characterize a larger set
of equilibria.3 By latent contract or or latent decision is meant any decision reachable
by the agent but never implemented at equilibrium, whatever the type of the agent. For
example, if a principal uses a incentive compatible direct mechanism, this mechanism
does not involve any “latent contract”. This former mechanism is a map from the type
set Θ to the decision set Yi, denoted σ˜i. By definition, for any decision y˜i in the image
set σ˜i (Θ), there is a type θ ∈ Θ such that σ˜i (θ) = y˜i.
Definition 2 We say that a menu Ti contains latent decisions if, given the strategies of
the other players T−i and σ∗o,
∃yi ∈ Ti, ∀θ ∈ Θ, σ∗0i (θ) 6= yi, (4)
where σ∗0i (θ) is the projection of σ∗0 over Ti.
From this definition, we can reach the following theorem:
Theorem 2 Consider the game ΓY and a pure strategy equilibrium. If principals offer
menus without latent decisions, then there exists an output equivalent incentive compat-
ible equilibrium in the direct mechanisms game ΓΘ.
Proof Consider an equilibrium
(
T ∗i ,T ∗−i,σ
∗
0
)
of the game ΓY . We wish to construct an
output equivalent equilibrium (σ˜i, σ˜−i, σ˜0) in the game ΓΘ.
By assumption, menus
(
T ∗i ,T ∗−i
)
do not involve latent decisions. One can consider
the agent’s equilibrium best reply σ∗0, which is, for every collection of menu T ∈ Z, a
function from set T ×Θ to the set T . We can construct unambiguously the following
direct mechanisms denoted σ˜i.
∀ i ∈ N, ∀θ ∈ Θ, σ˜∗i (θ) = σ∗0i
(
T ∗i ,T
∗
−i,θ
)
, (5)
where σ∗0i is defined as above. We have constructed the strategies
(
σ˜∗i , σ˜
∗
−i
)
∈ ˜Σ of the
principals in the game ΓΘ. Let us construct the agent’s best reply, denoted σ˜0. For all
σ˜ ∈ ˜Σ and for all θ ∈ Θ, we denote by σ˜i (Θ) the image set of the mapping σ˜i. Define
the best reply mapping of the agent as follows:
∀ σ˜ ∈ ˜Σ, ∀θ ∈ Θ, σ˜∗0 (σ˜,θ) = σ∗0
(
(σ˜i (Θ))i∈N ,θ
)
. (6)
3Latent contracts were introduced by Hellwig [1983], and the concept is widely used in the literature
on foundations of competitive equilibrium; see for example Bisin et al. [1999].
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For all collections of direct mechanism σ˜ ∈ ˜Σ, we have
σ˜∗0 (σ˜,θ) ∈ argmax
(h1,...,hN)∈ΘN
U
(
(σ˜i (hi))i∈N ,θ
)
. (7)
Suppose not:
∃ (h1, . . . ,hN) ∈ ΘN , ∃θ ∈ Θ, U
(
(σ˜i (hi))i∈N ,θ
)
> U
(
(σ˜i (σ˜
∗
i0 (σ˜,θ)))i∈N ,θ
)
. (8)
By construction, U
(
(σi0 (σ˜i (Θ)))i∈N ,θ
)
= U
((
σ˜i
(
σ˜∗0i (σ˜,θ)
))
i∈N ,θ
)
. Consequently,
U
(
(σ˜i (hi))i∈N ,θ
)
> U
(
(σ∗i0 (σ˜i (Θ)))i∈N ,θ
)
. (9)
Since by construction we have ∀ i ∈ N, σ˜i (hi) ∈ σ˜i (Θ), we generate a contradiction.
Moreover, we have:
∀θ ∈ Θ, σ˜∗0 (σ˜∗,θ) = (θ, . . . ,θ) , (10)
because, by definition for all θ ∈Θ and for every principal i, σ˜i (θ) = σ∗0i(T ∗,θ). Hence
the candidate equilibrium is incentive compatible.
Supppose that principals play σ˜∗, and principal i deviates toward σ˜i ∈ ˜Σi (all other
players keep their strategies). The agent’s best reply is then σ˜∗0
(
σ˜i, σ˜∗−i,θ
)
. The “no
latent decision assumption” implies that
∀ i ∈ N, ∀Yi ∈ T ∗i , ∃θ ∈ Θ such that σ∗0i (T ∗i ,θ) = yi. (11)
Hence,
∀ i ∈ N, σ˜∗i (Θ) = T ∗i . (12)
Using the definition of σ˜∗0, we can state that
∀ j ∈ N, ∀ i ∈ N, ∀σi ∈ Σi, σ˜∗0 j
(
σ˜i, σ˜
∗
−i,θ
)
= σ∗0 j
(
σ˜i (Θ) ,T ∗−i,θ
)
. (13)
Under the “no latent decision” condition:
∀ i ∈ N, ∀yi ∈ T ∗i , ∃h ∈ Θ, such that σ˜∗i (h) = yi. (14)
Hence, for all θ ∈ Θ, there exists (hi (θ) ,h−i (θ)) ∈ ΘN such that
(
σ˜i (hi (θ)) ,
(
σ˜∗j
(
h j (θ)
))
j∈Nr{i}
)
=
(
σ∗0i
(
σ˜i (Θ) ,T ∗−i,θ
)
,
(
σ∗0 j
(
σ˜i (Θ) ,T ∗−i,θ
))
j∈Nr{i}
)
.
(15)
Moreover, by definition (hi (θ) ,h−i (θ)) = σ˜∗0 (σ˜i,θ).
Suppose that for principal i the deviation is strictly profitable:
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Z
Θ
Vi
((
σ˜∗0 j
(
σ˜i, σ˜
∗
−i,θ
))
j∈N ,θ
)
d F (θ) >
Z
Θ
Vi
((
σ˜∗0 j
(
σ˜∗i , σ˜
∗
−i,θ
))
j∈N ,θ
)
d F (θ) .
(16)
Equation (16) can now be rewritten as
Z
Θ
Vi
((
σ∗0 j
(
σ˜i (Θ) ,T ∗−i,θ
))
j∈N ,θ
)
d F (θ) >
Z
Θ
Vi
((
σ∗0 j
(
T ∗i ,T
∗
−i,θ
))
j∈N ,θ
)
d F (θ) ,
(17)
which is a contradiction.
We conclude that
(
σ˜∗i , σ˜
∗
−i, σ˜
∗
0
)
is an equilibrium of the game ΓΘ. By construction,
this equilibrium is output equivalent to the equilibrium
(
T ∗i ,T ∗−i,σ
∗
0
)
. 2
Consider now the following example.
Example 1 Each principal (i = 1,2) must make a decision (y1i or y2i with i = 1,2). The
corresponding payoffs are given by the following matrix:
y12 y
2
2
y11 (2,2,3) (0,3,1)
y21 (1,0,1) (1,1,2)
Table 1: Common Agency with complete information
where the first element in each cell refers to the payoff of Principal 1, the second
element to the payoff of Principal 2, and the last element to the agent’s payoff.
If we consider that principals are using direct mechanisms (which are take-it or
leave-it offers since information is complete), there is only one pure strategy equilib-
rium: Principal 1 plays y21 and principal 2 plays y22. Agent’s payoffs are not relevant,
since the the agent plays no role.
If principals are allowed to use menus, so that they offer subsets of
{
y1i ,y2i
}
, then
there are two equilibria. In the first equilibrium, principal 1 offers the degenerated
menu
{
y21
}
and the second principal offers the menu
{
y22
}
. Although the agent has no
relevant choice, it can nevertheless be confirmed that we have a regular equilibrium. In
the second equilibrium, principal 1 offers the menu
{
y11,y
2
1
}
and principal 2 offers the
menu
{
y12,y
2
2
}
. The agent chooses y11 from principal 1 and y12 from principal 2. The
outcome
(
y11,y
1
2
)
is finally implemented.
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The outcome
(
y11,y
1
2
)
cannot be supported by an equilibrium if principals use only
direct mechanisms. If principal 1 offers
{
y11
}
, the direct mechanism
{
y12
}
is not the best
reply for principal 2. He gets more by offering
{
y22
}
.
The outcome
(
y11,y
1
2
)
can be implemented because menus
{
y12,y
2
2
}
and
{
y11,y
2
1
}
em-
bed latent decisions: y21 and y22 are not chosen by the agent, but they are crucial because
they prevent deviations. 2
Let us consider a second example.
Example 2 The type of the agent is θ1 with probability p1 = 1/2, and θ2 with probability
1− p1. Payoffs are given by the following matrices:
θ1 θ2
y12 y
2
2
y11 (2,2,3) (0,3,1)
y21 (1,0,1) (1,1,2)
y12 y
2
2
y11 (0,1,2) (1,0,1)
y21 (0,3,1) (2,2,3)
Table 2: Common Agency with incomplete information
This game has an equilibrium in the menu game. Each principal proposes the menu{
y1i ,y2i
} (i = 1,2); the agent chooses (y11,y12) if his type is θ1, and chooses (y21,y22) if his
type is θ2. Since the set of possible menus is very small, we can check that for principal
1 no deviations (which are the singletons {y11} and {y21}) are profitable. The same holds
for principal 2.
The outcome can also be supported as an equilibrium in the direct mechanism game.
For principal 1 the former strategy can be reproduced in the following way: he plays y11 if
the agent sends the message θ1, and plays y21 if the agent announces θ2. Principal 2 plays
the same strategy (y12 if θ1 and y22 if θ2). The agent can reach any cell by misreporting
his type. By analogy with the menu game, it is best for the agent to announce his real
type. Using a similar argument, one can check that the strategies described are also best
replies for the principals. 2
Consider a last example taken from the literature.
Example 3 [Biais and Mariotti [2005]] There are two principals (indexed by i = 1,2),
and their decision spaces are Y1 = Y2 = Y = R× [0,1]. A generic decision is denoted
by (t,q). The two principals have the same utility functions θq− t, where θ is the
information of the agent, θ ∈ [0,1]. The distribution function of θ over [0,1] is denoted
by F .
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Agent preferences are represented by the utility function t−λθq, where the variable
λ ∈ (0,1); this is common knowledge. The agent is constrained to accept contracts
(t1,q1) and (t2,q2) such that q1+q2 ≤ 1.
Assume that E(θ) < λ, where E(θ) = R 10 θF(θ)dθ. Then an equilibrium exists in
which each principal offers the menu M = {(t,q) ∈ Y |t = qE(θ)}. If the two principals
offer this menu, the agent (whatever his type) will choose the allocation q = 1 and
t = E(θ). If one principal deviates, and offers a unique contract (t ′,q′), then
• If (t ′,q′) is below the line t = qE(θ), the agent will accept this contract and the
deviating principal makes zero profit, as he did at equilibrium. The deviation is
not profitable.
• If (t ′,q′) is above the line t = qE(θ), the agent will always accept the contract
offered. Whatever his type, the agent will buy a quantity q = 1−q′ from ***OK?
- EDITOR*** the other principal. Since t ′/q′ < E(θ), the deviating principal
makes losses.
This argument can easily extended to any kind of menu.
If we now look at the best direct mechanism against the menu M, it is obvious that
the degenerated mechanism gives the contract (E(θ),1) to every type. It is also clear
that, if one principal plays that mechanism, it is not the best reply for the other principal
to play that same mechanism. He should offer the contract (t ′,q′), where t ′ = λq′ . This
contract is accepted by the agent only when his type is θ = 1, in which case it provides
positive profit to the principal.
The equilibrium characterized by Biais and Mariotti [4] is efficient, so that if we
ignore it, we may reach wrong conclusions. 2
In the preceding example, the menus
{
y11,y
2
1
}
and
{
y12,y
2
2
}
do not embed latent
decisions. For principal 1, y11 (resp. y21) is chosen when the agent’s type is θ1 (resp. θ2).
Similarly, for principal 2, item y12 is chosen if the agent is of type θ1, and y22 is chosen
when the type is θ2. Menus do not embed latent decisions, so that the equilibrium can
be sustained by direct mechanisms. Moreover, at equilibrium, the agent reveals his true
type.
5 Applied Common Agency Models
Let us now focus on examples taken from the literature.
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To characterize equilibria in the set of menus is not a trivial exercise. Martimort
[1996] and Martimort and Stole [2002] have introduced a sophisticated methodology.
• They consider that principal i uses direct mechanisms σ˜∗i to reply to the menus
T ∗−i and to the agent’s strategy.
• From the best direct mechanism, one can deduce a menu.
• If this is done for every principal, and if each principal is playing the menu derived
from the best direct mechanism, we finally obtain an equilibrium.
At equilibrium, menus do not involve latent decisions; each item is chosen by some
agent. This method provides no gain over the traditional method; any equilibrium char-
acterized using this methodology can be characterized by the simple use of direct mech-
anisms.
Here is an example that shows how this methodology fails to characterize any equi-
librium of a common agency game.
Example 4 The type of the agent is θ1 with probability p1 = 1/2, and θ2 with probability
1− p1. Payoffs are given by the following matrices:
θ1 θ2
y12 y
2
2
y11 (2,2,3) (0,3,1)
y21 (1,0,1) (1,1,4)
y12 y
2
2
y11 (4,2,2) (2,3,0)
y21 (1,0,1) (1,1,5)
Table 3: Common Agency with incomplete information
This common agency game has one pure strategy equilibrium. The first principal
(P1) plays the menu {y11,y21} and the second principal plays the menu {y12}, and gets
an expected utility of 2. Clearly, the first principal has no profitable deviation. The
second principal has two possible deviations in the menu game:
{
y22
}
and
{
y12,y
2
2
}
. If
the second principal plays
{
y22
}
or the menu
{
y12,y
2
2
}
then his expected utility is 1.
Using the Martimort-Stole algorithm we cannot characterize the equilibrium de-
scribed above. If player 2 is playing the menu
{
y12
}
, the unique best reply of principal
1 is to play the direct mechanism (with incentive compatible revelation of type):
σ1 (θ1) = σ1 (θ2) = y11.
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This mechanism is equivalent to the menu
{
y11
}
. The best reply to the menu
{
y11
}
for
principal 2 (in the set of direct mechanisms) is to play the mechanism
σ2 (θ1) = σ2 (θ2) = y22,
or equivalently the menu
{
y22
}
, and not the menu
{
y12
}
. By construction, menus char-
acterized by the Martimort-Stole algorithm do not embed latent decisions; they support
equilibria which can also be supported by direct mechanisms. 2
This methodology has been used, explicitly or implicitly, in several papers: Biais
et al. [2000] Calzolari [2004], Laffont and Pouyet [2004], Martimort and Stole [2003]
and Khalil et al. [2005], and in several other unpublished papers: Olsen and Osmundsen
[2003], Diaw and Pouyet [2004] or Calzolari and Scarpa [2004]. These authors are able
to characterize regular and realistic equilibria. Nevertheless, these equilibria could have
been characterized using the standard methods of mechanisms design. Moreover, the
authors may not succeed in characterizing all of the equilibria of the communication
game.
When Martimort and Stole [2003] consider a complete information version of their
game (i.e., when |Θ| = 1; roughly speaking, when their model is qualitatively similar
to our first example) by using menus, they are able to characterize equilibria that could
not have been characterized by direct mechanisms. (Direct mechanisms are take-it or
leave-it offers in that case.) They do not then use the former ***CLARIFY - EDI-
TOR*** methodology. For complete information games, their analysis of their model
is invaluable, as it does not rely on the former methodology.4
Martimort [1992] proposes an original methodology. He proposes focusing on direct
mechanisms, and extends the type set: the agent can report a type belonging to the set
˜Θ, with Θ⊂ ˜Θ. At equilibrium, whatever his type is, the agent is reporting his true type,
but the fact that he can report ˜θ /∈ Θ (a type which does not exist) and get yi
(
˜θ
) (an
outcome that cannot be reached if he reports any θ ∈Θ), extends his possible strategies.
The outcome yi
(
˜θ
)
is never reach at equilibrium. The possibility of reporting an “absurd
type” makes some deviations of the other principals unprofitable, as in examples 1 and 3.
Clearly, this methodology is able to characterize equilibria that cannot be characterized
if we restrict our attention to direct mechanisms. The decision yi
(
˜θ
)
is clearly a “latent
decision”. Let us reconsider our last example.
Example 5 The payoffs are given by the following matrices:
4They use the term “singleton contracts” instead of take-it or leave-it offers.
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θ1 θ2
y12 y
2
2
y11 (2,2,3) (0,3,1)
y21 (1,0,1) (1,1,4)
y12 y
2
2
y11 (4,2,2) (2,3,0)
y21 (1,0,1) (1,1,5)
Table 4: Common Agency with incomplete information
The equilibrium can be also characterized in the following way. The first principal
plays the direct mechanism
σ˜1 :
{
θ1,θ2, ˜θ
}
→
{
y11,y
2
1
}


σ˜1 (θ1) = y11,
σ˜1 (θ2) = y11,
σ˜1
(
˜θ
)
= y21,
where ˜θ is an absurd type.
The second principal plays the direct mechanism
σ2 :
{
θ1,θ2, ˜θ
}
→
{
y11,y
2
1
}
{
σ2 (θ1) = y12,
σ2 (θ2) = y12.
The direct mechanisms σ˜1 and σ2 constitute an equilibrium. The best strategy for
the agent is to reveal his type. (We do not describe the agent’s strategy, as it is very long
and is not necessary.) The first principal has no profitable strategy; he gets his maximum
payoff in each state of nature. For the second principal there are many possible direct
mechanisms. But the second principal cannot get a payoff greater than 2: in every state
of nature, if y22 is implemented, the agent will report the type ˜θ to the first principal
(whatever his real type) and the second principal will get a payoff of value 1. Thus,
principal 2 has no profitable deviations.
If principal 1 plays the direct mechanism
σ1 :
{
θ1,θ2, ˜θ
}
→
{
y11,y
2
1
}
{
σ1 (θ1) = y11,
σ1 (θ2) = y11,
then the second principal has a profitable deviation; playing the mechanisms σ2 (θ) = y22
for every θ gives him a payoff of value 3. 2
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The weakness of this approach is that there is no theory of how to determine the set
˜Θ and of how to construct the mechanisms σi for values of θ which are not in Θ. Indeed,
Martimort [1992] characterizes the equilibrium using the Martimort-Stole algorithm.
6 Conclusion
Almost all of the literature on common agency with incomplete information focuses
on equilibria that can be characterized by direct mechanisms.5 Some papers explicitly
apply the Revelation Principle even if it is not applicable. By doing this they may
characterize only a subset of all equilibria, and miss some realistic equilibria. Other
articles use different mathematical tools and more complex mechanisms, but without
characterizing a larger set of equilibria.
We still lack a simple, general, systematic approach for characterizing all of the
equilibria of a large class of common agency games. The complexity of the existing
methodology (menu or extended types) indicates that this will be a demanding task.
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